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By CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS AND JOSEPH R. MASON*
We assemble bank-level and other data for Fed member banks to model determi-
nants of bank failure. Fundamentals explain bank failure risk well. The first two
Friedman-Schwartz crises are not associated with positive unexplained residual
failure risk, or increased importance of bank illiquidity for forecasting failure. The
third Friedman-Schwartz crisis is more ambiguous, but increased residual failure
risk is small in the aggregate. The final crisis (early 1933) saw a large unexplained
increase in bank failure risk. Local contagion and illiquidity may have played a role
in pre-1933 bank failures, even though those effects were not large in their
aggregate impact. (JEL N22, G21, N12, E32, E5)
The central unresolved question about the
causes of bank distress during the Depression is
the extent to which the waves of bank failures
and deposit contraction (which together define
bank distress) reflected “fundamental” deterio-
ration in bank health, or alternatively, “panics”
or sudden crises of systemic illiquidity that may
have forced viable banks to fail. The causes of
bank distress are particularly relevant from the
perspective of modern macroeconomic theories
of the relationship between bank distress and
economic fluctuations, and public policy de-
bates about the appropriate responses of central
banks to financial crises. To the extent that bank
distress was not due to fundamental bank weak-
ness, policy actions to protect threatened banks
via Fed or government loans or other assistance
might have prevented failures and deposit con-
traction. If the collapse of the banking system
was driven by events within the banking system
(rather than shocks to banks from the “real”
economy), that would also have important im-
plications for macroeconomic theory—namely,
the implication that the financial sector itself
can be an important source of shocks, not just a
victim or a propagator of shocks (see Douglas
W. Diamond and Phillip H. Dybvig, 1983;
Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale, 2000; Dia-
mond and Raghuram Rajan, 2002).
The list of fundamental shocks that may have
weakened banks is a long and varied one. It
includes declines in the value of bank loan
portfolios produced by rising default risk in the
wake of regional, sectoral, or national macro-
economic shocks to bank borrowers, as well as
monetary-policy-induced declines in the prices
of the bonds held by banks. There is no doubt
that adverse fundamental shocks relevant to
bank solvency were contributors to bank dis-
tress; the controversy is over the size of these
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fundamental shocks—that is, whether banks ex-
periencing distress were truly insolvent or sim-
ply illiquid.
Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz
(1963) are the most prominent advocates of the
view that many bank failures resulted from un-
warranted “panic” and that failing banks were in
large measure illiquid rather than insolvent.
Friedman and Schwartz attach great importance
to the banking crisis of late 1930, which they
attribute to a “contagion of fear” that resulted
from the failure of a large New York bank, the
Bank of United States, which they regard as
itself a victim of panic.
They also identify two other banking crises in
1931—from March to August 1931, and from
Britain’s departure from the gold standard (Sep-
tember 21, 1931) through the end of the year.
The fourth and final banking crisis they identify
occurred at the end of 1932 and the beginning of
1933, culminating in the nationwide suspension of
banks in March. The 1933 crisis and suspension
was the beginning of the end of the Depression,
but the 1930 and 1931 crises (because they did not
result in suspension) were, in Friedman and
Schwartz’s judgment, important sources of shock
to the real economy that turned a recession in
1929 into the Great Depression of 1929–1933.
Friedman and Schwartz’s (1963) summary of
the aggregate trends for the macroeconomy and
the banking sector focuses on the extreme se-
verity of the banking crises (the incidence of
bank suspension) and the accompanying de-
clines in deposits and the money multiplier.
They argue that Federal Reserve errors of com-
mission (decisions to tighten) and omission
(failures to address the problem of banking
“panic” and bank illiquidity) were central
causes of the economic collapse of the Depres-
sion. Our interest is in the second aspect—the
question of whether the banking collapses were
unwarranted panics that forced solvent but il-
liquid banks to fail. The Friedman and Schwartz
argument is based upon the suddenness of bank-
ing distress during the panics that they identify,
and the absence of collapses in relevant macro-
economic time series prior to those banking
crises (see Charts 27–30 in Friedman and
Schwartz, 1963, p. 309).1
But there are reasons to question Friedman
and Schwartz’s view of the exogenous origins
of the banking crises of the Depression. As
Calomiris and Gary Gorton (1991) show, pre-
Depression panics were moments of temporary
confusion about which (of a very small number
of banks) were insolvent. In contrast, as Peter
Temin (1976) and many others have noted, the
bank failures during the Depression marked a
continuation of the severe banking sector dis-
tress that had gripped agricultural regions
throughout the 1920’s. Of the nearly 15,000
bank disappearances that occurred between
1920 and 1933, roughly half predate 1930. And
massive numbers of bank failures occurred dur-
ing the Depression era outside the crisis win-
dows identified by Friedman and Schwartz
(notably, in 1932). Wicker (1996, p. 1) esti-
mates that “[b]etween 1930 and 1932 of the
more than 5,000 banks that closed only 38 per-
cent suspended during the first three banking
crisis episodes.”2 Recent studies of the condi-
tion of the Bank of United States indicate that it
too was insolvent, not just illiquid, in December
1930 (Joseph Lucia, 1985; Friedman and
Schwartz, 1986; Anthony P. O’Brien, 1992;
1 Exaggerated fears of bank insolvency were not the only
potential contributors to runs on solvent banks. In the case
of the banking crisis of 1933, Barrie A. Wigmore (1987)
sees the risk of abandoning the gold standard as an impor-
tant exogenous motivator of depositor flight from solvent
banks. Wigmore emphasizes external currency drain and the
expectation of the departure from the gold standard, not
concerns over domestic bank solvency, as the precipitating
event that led to the March 6 declaration of a national bank
holiday. Elmus Wicker (1996) accepts the importance of the
external drain in early 1933, but argues that Wigmore un-
derestimates the importance of the regional crisis that
gripped midwestern banks (beginning with Michigan banks)
in early 1933.
2 Furthermore, banking distress in the 1930’s did not
provoke collective action by banks (clearinghouse actions to
share risks or suspend convertibility), as had been the case
in the pre-Fed era. Friedman and Schwartz argue that “... the
existence of the Reserve System prevented concerted re-
striction ... by reducing the concern of stronger banks,
which had in the past typically taken the lead in such a
concerted move ... and indirectly, by supporting the general
assumption that such a move was made unnecessary by the
establishment of the System” (1963, p. 311). Another pos-
sibility is that collective action was not warranted (i.e.,
solvent banks were not threatened by the failures of insol-
vent banks). Collective action remained feasible, as illus-
trated by the behavior of Chicago banks in June 1932, but
Friedman and Schwartz see these as exceptions. See F. Cyril
James (1938) and Calomiris and Mason (1997) for details
on the Chicago panic and the role of collective action in
resolving it.
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Paul B. Trescott, 1992; Wicker, 1996). So there
is some prima facie evidence that the banking
distress of the Depression era was more than a
problem of panic-inspired depositor flight.
But how can one attribute bank failures dur-
ing the Depression to fundamentals when Fried-
man and Schwartz’s evidence indicates no prior
changes in macroeconomic fundamentals? One
possibility is that Friedman and Schwartz omit-
ted important aggregate measures of the state of
the economy relevant for bank solvency. For
example, measures of commercial distress and
construction activity may be useful indicators of
fundamental shocks.
A second possibility is that aggregation of
fundamentals masks important sectoral, local,
and regional shocks that buffeted banks with
particular credit or market risks. The most im-
portant challenge to Friedman and Schwartz’s
aggregate view of bank distress during the De-
pression has come from the work of Wicker
(1980, 1996). Using a narrative approach simi-
lar to that of Friedman and Schwartz, but rely-
ing on data disaggregated to the level of the
Federal Reserve districts and on local newspa-
per accounts of banking distress, Wicker argues
that it is incorrect to identify the banking crisis
of 1930 and the first banking crisis of 1931 as
national panics comparable to those of the pre-
Fed era. According to Wicker, the proper way to
understand the process of banking failure dur-
ing the Depression is to disaggregate, both by
region and by bank, because heterogeneity was
very important in determining the incidence of
bank failures.
Once one disaggregates, Wicker argues, it
becomes apparent that at least the first two of
the three banking crises of 1930–1931 identi-
fied by Friedman and Schwartz were largely
regional affairs. Wicker (1980, 1996) argues
that the failures of November 1930 reflected
regional shocks and the specific risk exposures
of a small subset of banks, linked to Nashville-
based Caldwell & Co., the largest investment
bank in the South at the time of its failure.
Temin (1989, p. 50) reaches a similar conclu-
sion. He argues that the “panic” of 1930 was not
really a panic, and that the failure of Caldwell &
Co. and the Bank of United States reflected
fundamental weakness in those institutions.
Wicker’s analysis of the third banking crisis
(beginning September 1931) also shows that
bank suspensions were concentrated in a very
few locales, although he regards the nationwide
increase in the tendency to convert deposits into
cash as evidence of a possible nationwide bank-
ing crisis in September and October 1931.
Wicker agrees with Friedman and Schwartz that
the final banking crisis (of 1933), which re-
sulted in universal suspension of bank opera-
tions, was nationwide in scope. The banking
crisis that culminated in the bank holidays of
February–March 1933 resulted in the suspen-
sion of at least some bank operations (bank
“holidays”) for nearly all banks in the country
by March 6.
From the regionally disaggregated perspec-
tive of Wicker’s findings, the inability to ex-
plain the timing of bank failures using aggregate
time-series data (which underlay the Friedman-
Schwartz view that banking failures were an
unwarranted and autonomous source of shock)
would not be surprising even if bank failures
were entirely due to fundamental insolvency.
Failures of banks were local phenomena in 1930
and 1931, and so may have had little to do with
national shocks to income, the price level, in-
terest rates, and asset prices.
The unique industrial organization of the
American banking industry is of central impor-
tance to the Wicker view of the process of bank
failure during the Depression. Banks in the
United States (unlike banks in other countries)
did not operate throughout the country. They
were smaller, regionally isolated institutions.
In the United States, therefore, large region-
specific shocks might produce a sudden wave of
bank failures in specific regions even though no
evidence of a shock was visible in aggregate
macroeconomic time series (see the cross-country
evidence in Ben S. Bernanke and Harold James,
1991, and Richard S. Grossman, 1994).
Microeconomic studies of banking distress
have provided some useful evidence on the re-
actions of individual banks to economic dis-
tress, which bears on these macroeconomic
debates. Eugene N. White (1984) showed that
the failures of banks in 1930 are best explained
as a continuation of the agricultural distress of
the 1920’s, and were traceable to fundamental
disturbances in agricultural markets. Calomiris
and Mason (1997) studied the Chicago banking
panic of June 1932 (a locally isolated phenom-
enon). They found that the panic resulted only
in a temporary unwarranted contraction of de-
posits; local fundamentals determined both the
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long-run contraction of bank deposits and
which Chicago banks failed before and during
the panic. Calomiris and Berry Wilson (1998)
studied the behavior of New York City banks
during the interwar period, and in particular,
analyzed the contraction of their lending during
the 1930’s. They found that banking distress
was an informed market response to observable
weaknesses in particular banks, traceable to ex
ante bank characteristics.
Taken together, these studies suggest that lo-
cal fundamentals played a large role in gener-
ating banking distress during the Depression.
From the standpoint of the larger macroeco-
nomic questions that underlie much of the in-
terest in the origins of banking distress during
the Depression, however, existing microecono-
metric contributions suffer from three weak-
nesses. First, they rely upon limited samples.
Analysis of banks in particular locations, or at
particular times, may paint a misleading picture
of the causes of banking distress for the country
as a whole during the Depression. Second, some
of the previous microeconomic studies have
used sources that contain a limited set of bank
characteristics, and which exclude characteris-
tics that are likely to be important in modeling
bank distress (as indicated by the results of
Calomiris and Mason, 1997, which show the
advantage of including a relatively rich set of
characteristics).
Third, none of the microeconometric studies
has tried to measure the relative importance of
fundamentals and “contagion” for explaining
bank failures at the regional or national level.
This is an important omission. The fact that
regional shocks were important (as argued by
Wicker and others) does not in itself disprove
the Friedman-Schwartz view that runs on
banks resulted in large part from panic. Indeed,
Wicker—who disputes the existence of nation-
wide panics in 1930 and early 1931—argues
that local and regional panics contributed to
bank failures over and above fundamental re-
gional shocks.
This paper assembles a rich disaggregated
data set capable of linking fundamental sources
of bank weakness—individual Fed member
bank’s portfolio and liability structure and con-
dition, and local, regional, and national eco-
nomic shocks—to the process of bank failure.
We construct a survival duration model of
banks that relates information about the timing
of individual bank failures to the characteristics
of individual banks, and to the changing local,
regional, and national economic environment in
which they operated. A detailed, disaggregated
model of the fundamental determinants of bank
failure makes possible the evaluation of the
relative importance of contagion for generating
banking distress.
To summarize our objectives, we seek (1) to
gauge the extent to which the attributes of spe-
cific banks, in concert with the fundamental
local or national shocks that buffeted those
banks, can explain the timing and incidence of
bank failures, (2) to evaluate the importance of
panic or contagion—nationally or locally—as a
cause of bank failure during the Depression, and
(3) to identify the extent to which particular
banking crises were national or regional events.
Our investigation of the causes of banking
distress relies upon the fact that the U.S. bank-
ing system was geographically fragmented. In
most states, banks were not free to operate
branches (the so-called “unit” banking restric-
tion). Even in states that permitted branching
within the state, branching was often limited,
and in all cases, branching was not allowed
outside the state.3 Geographic fragmentation
of banking permits one to identify location-
specific and bank-specific determinants of fail-
ure for a large sample of banks, and to
investigate whether the failures of banks located
nearby affected the probability of a bank’s fail-
ure (a local contagion effect).
The chief limitation of our data set is that it
only covers Fed member banks (national banks
plus state-chartered banks that belonged to the
Federal Reserve System). Most bank failures
during the Depression were nonmember banks,
so there is some question as to whether our
results offer an adequate portrayal of the expe-
rience of all banks. We discuss this issue in
more detail in Section I below.
The remainder of this paper is organized
as follows. Section I briefly describes the data
set and defines and explains the limits of our
investigation—that is, why we confine our
attention to certain measures of economic per-
formance, and to Fed member banks’ behavior.
Section II contains our analysis of the causes of
3 See Calomiris (2000) for a review of the history of unit
banking restrictions and their costs.
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bank failure using data on individual banks.
Specifically, in Section II we construct a sur-
vival duration model for banks and consider the
significance of bank characteristics, shocks to
the economic environment, and various mea-
sures of “contagion” or “panic” for reducing the
probability of bank survival. Section III sum-
marizes our results and concludes.
I. Data
The sources and definitions of the data used
in our empirical work are discussed in detail in
the Data Appendix. Our data set combines data
on individual bank characteristics for Fed mem-
ber banks observed in December 1929 and
December 1931 with county-, state-, and
national-level data at monthly, quarterly, and
annual frequencies. These data permit us to
measure bank distress by date of failure at var-
ious levels of disaggregation, and to capture a
variety of influences on bank distress. Ta-
ble 1 summarizes the measures of bank charac-
teristics we constructed and the measures we
employ to capture variation in the local, re-
gional, and national economic environment.
Tables 2 and 3 provide information about
variation over time and across regions in the
incidence of bank failure, which we define as
bank closure and liquidation. Tables 2a and 2b
report semiannual numbers and deposits of Fed
member banks that failed, by region. Tables 3a
and 3b express these regional-level measures of
bank failure as fractions of total Fed member
banks, or total Fed member bank deposits, in
each region at the end of 1929. The data re-
ported in Tables 2 and 3 have not been collected
or reported in previous studies (more detailed
data are described in Calomiris and Mason,
2000). These data clearly show the remark-
able heterogeneity in regional experiences of
bank distress and deposit growth during the
Depression.
Figures 1–3 report various macroeconomic
time series alongside our measure of Fed mem-
ber banks’ conditional failure hazard. These
data provide a similar picture of aggregate bank
distress over time to the evidence on bank sus-
pension rates in Friedman and Schwartz, and
confirm Friedman and Schwartz’s view that ag-
gregate macroeconomic indicators provide a
poor explanation for the timing of waves of
bank failures. The only macroeconomic indica-
tor that shows sudden change similar to that of
bank failures is the liabilities of failed busi-
nesses, and it does not show increases prior to
the first three panic episodes identified by Fried-
man and Schwartz, although it often does move
in parallel to bank failure risk. The evidence
presented in Tables 2–3 and Figures 1–3 shows
that our sample of Fed member banks provides
pictures of the timing of total bank failures, the
relationship between aggregate bank failures
and macroeconomic aggregates, and the re-
gional and temporal distribution of bank fail-
ures that are similar to those in Friedman and
Schwartz (1963) and Wicker (1996). Visual in-
spection of aggregate variables indicates that
they are not very helpful in predicting the Fried-
man and Schwartz crisis windows, and the
cross-sectional variation emphasized by Wick-
er’s discussion of suspensions at the Fed Dis-
trict level is quite visible in the pattern of bank
failures at the state level. These tables and fig-
ures provide prima facie evidence for the desir-
ability of disaggregating the analysis of bank
failure and examining connections between fun-
damental determinants of bank weakness and
the probability of bank failures.
Despite the fact that the national and regional
aggregate time series of suspension rates for all
banks coincides with the national and regional
average survival hazards for our sample of Fed
member banks, the absence of nonmember
banks from our sample is an important limita-
tion of our analysis of bank failure, which may
matter for more disaggregated results. As of
June 30, 1929, nonmember banks comprised
15,797 of the 24,504 banks in existence (of
which 7,530 were national banks and 1,177
were state-chartered member banks). Non-
member banks were smaller on average, ac-
counting for 27 percent of total bank deposits.
Failure rates were higher for nonmember
banks. Nonmember banks fell as a proportion
of total banks from 63 percent of the number
of banks in June 1929 to 57 percent by June
1933. In Calomiris and Mason (2000), we
found that indicators of the condition of Fed
member banks within the county were useful
indicators of annual suspension rates or de-
posit growth rates at the county level for all
banks. Despite that evidence for the represen-
tativeness of Fed member banks, it is possible
that nonmember banks had different sensi-
tivities to panic events, so our conclusions
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TABLE 1—VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
BANK CHARACTERISTICS, Measured Biannually (December 1929, December 1931)
Basic bank characteristics:
LTotAss  log (Total Assets)
STBANK  State-Chartered Indicator (equal to 1 for State-Chartered Bank)
LNBRANCH  log [ max (number of branches, 0.0010) ]
MKTPWR  Total Deposits / Deposits of All Banks in the County Bank Asset Composition
NonCash_TotAss  “Non-Cash” Assets / Total Assets
“Non-Cash” Assets  Total Assets  (U.S. Govt. Securities  Reserves  Cash Due from Banks  Outside
Checks and Other Cash Items)
Loans_OtherNonCash  Loans and Discounts / (Noncash Assets  Loans and Discounts)
LIQLOANS  Loans Eligible for Rediscount / Loans and Discounts
DFB_CashAss  Cash due from Banks / (U.S. Govt. Securities  Reserves  Cash Due from Banks  Outside
Checks and Other Cash Items)
Asset quality measures:
Losses_Exp  Losses on Assets and Trading / Total Expenses (Including Losses)
REO_NonCashAss  Real Estate Owned / Noncash Assets
(BONDYLD)(SEC)  (Change in U.S. Govt. Bond Yield)(Bonds and Other Securities)
Change in U.S. Govt. Bond Yield  (This Month’s Bond Yield  Bond Yield of Same Month in Previous Year)
Liability mix and cost:
TD  Total Deposits  Due to Banks  Demand Deposits  Time Deposits  U.S. Government Deposits  Bills
Payable and Rediscounts
NW_TA  (Capital  Surplus  Undivided Profits  Contingency Reserve) / TA
(DD  DTB)_TD  Demand Deposits  Due to Banks / TD
DTB_TD  Due to Banks / TD
BPR_TD  Bills Payable and Rediscounts / TD
PrivBPR_BPR  Private Bills Payable and Rediscounts / BPR
INTCOST  Interest and Discount Expenses on TD / TD
COUNTY CHARACTERISTICS, Measured in 1930, Unless Otherwise Noted
PCT_CROPINC30  Crop Value /(Crop Value  Manufacturing Value Added)
PCT_ACRES_PAST30  Acreage in Pasture / Total Acreage in Farms
VALGR_INC_CROP30  Value of Cereals, Oats, Grains, Seeds / Total Crop Value
UNEMP30  (Persons Out of Work  Persons Laid Off) / Number of Gainful Workers
SMLFM30  Farms of Less Than 100 Acres / Total Number of Farms
(DAGLBE)  (PCT_CROPINC30)  (PCT_CROPINC30)  (Growth in Value of Farm Land, Buildings, and
Equipment from 1920 to 1930)
PCT_STBANK (annual data)  Number of State-Chartered Banks, Including Nonmember Banks/Total Number of
Banks
STATE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
STBUILDPERM (monthly)  Value of Buildings with New Permits in Cities within the State / State Income in 1929
STBUSFAIL (quarterly)  Value of Liabilities of Failed Businesses / State Income in 1929
NATIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
NATDAGP (monthly)  Log Difference, Agricultural Price Index, Seasonally Adjusted
NATDBUSFAIL (monthly)  Log Difference (Current Log Value Less Log Value for Same Month in Previous Year),
Value of Liabilities of Failed Businesses
DISTRESS INDICATOR VARIABLES
FSPANIC-30  1 for November and December 1930 and January 1931, and 0 Otherwise
FSPANIC-31a  1 for May–June 1931, and 0 Otherwise
FSPANIC-31b  1 for September–November 1931, and 0 Otherwise
DUM_JAN-33  1 for January 1933, and 0 Otherwise
DUM_FEB-33  1 for February 1933, and 0 Otherwise
DUM_MAR-33  1 for March 1933, and 0 Otherwise
WICKER-30  1 for November 1930–January 1931 for Banks in Tennessee, Kentucky, Arkansas, North Carolina, and
Mississippi, and 0 Otherwise
WICKER-31a  1 for April–July 1931 for Banks in Illinois and Ohio, and 0 Otherwise
WICKER-31b  1 for September–October 1931 for Banks in West Virginia, Ohio, Missouri, Illinois, and
Pennsylvania, and 0 Otherwise
Chicago-6-32  1 for Banks in Chicago for June 1932, and 0 Otherwise
NEARFAILS  Log (Deposits in Other Banks That Failed in that Month in the Same State)
Sources: See Data Appendix.
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below about Fed member banks may not hold
for nonmember banks.
II. Modeling Bank Failure: Fundamentals and
Contagion
Our bank failure data, which track the spe-
cific dates of each Fed member bank failure,
allow us to model each bank’s daily failure
hazard as a function of various fundamentals,
including bank-specific variables observed at
earlier call report dates, county characteristics,
and state- and national-level time series ob-
served at relatively high frequency. All survival
duration models we report are estimated using
the log-logistic distribution. Detailed descrip-
tions of the survival duration methodology can
be found in Nicholas M. Kiefer (1988), Tony
Lancaster (1990), and Guido W. Imbens (1994).
One of the advantages of the survival hazard
model is its flexibility in using data observed at
different levels of aggregation and different fre-
quencies. County-level variables (which are
only observed once during the sample period)
exert a constant effect on the hazard rate, bank-
specific variables (observed biannually at call
report dates) affect the hazard rate for two
years, and state- and national-level monthly or
quarterly series affect the hazard rate on a
monthly or quarterly basis.
Our model of the determinants of failure
starts with many of the same bank-level deter-
minants that were found to be useful in Calo-
miris and Mason (1997) to explain bank failures
during the Chicago panic of June 1932. Our
model of bank failures throughout the country
over several years differs, however, from that
earlier paper (which focused on failures
TABLE 2a—NUMBER OF FAILED SAMPLE BANKS, SEMIANNUALLY, 1930–1933
Region 1930-1 1930-2 1931-1 1931-2 1932-1 1932-2 1933-All Total
Central 15 29 45 75 59 25 130 378
Mid-Atlantic 7 14 28 51 33 16 58 207
Mountain 8 7 5 16 9 9 18 72
New England 1 1 4 9 6 0 22 43
Northwestern 25 30 42 68 37 43 114 359
Pacific 3 3 10 10 23 14 21 84
South Atlantic 21 16 21 36 20 9 26 149
South Central 28 35 49 42 35 32 50 271
Total 108 135 204 307 222 148 439 1,563
Notes: Tables are constructed from 1,716 failed banks in the authors’ total data set of 8,470 Federal Reserve Member Banks.
Deposits are those recorded from the last available call report prior to failure. Regions are defined as follows: New England
contains ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, and CT. Mid-Atlantic contains NY, NJ, and PA. South Atlantic contains MD, DE, DC, VA,
WV, NC, SC, GA, and FL. South Central contains KY, TN, AL, MS, AR, OK, LA, and TX. Central contains OH, IL, IN,
MI, and WI. Northwestern contains MN, IA, MO, ND, SD, NE, and KS. Mountain contains MT, ID, WY, CO, NM, AZ, UT,
and NV. Pacific contains WA, OR, and CA. State-level quarterly versions of these tables are available in Calomiris and
Mason, 2000.
TABLE 2b—DEPOSITS OF FAILED SAMPLE BANKS, SEMIANNUALLY, 1930–1933 ($ THOUSANDS)
Region 1930-1 1930-2 1931-1 1931-2 1932-1 1932-2 1933-All Total
Central 30,587 66,660 92,809 304,891 118,229 216,993 898,204 1,728,374
Mid-Atlantic 57,515 34,606 101,747 146,340 310,550 16,631 135,573 802,962
Mountain 5,965 1,908 1,839 6,532 2,754 12,719 16,475 48,193
New England 913 1,686 9,542 49,280 137,536 0 56,228 255,184
Northwestern 29,825 21,765 24,041 36,104 33,411 32,573 116,033 293,752
Pacific 1,018 5,521 5,067 8,318 29,195 13,686 70,224 133,029
South Atlantic 42,184 54,850 16,535 38,854 29,555 5,814 127,409 315,200
South Central 26,140 77,399 60,867 39,933 37,865 61,537 28,311 332,051
Total 194,146 264,395 312,447 630,252 699,095 359,953 1,448,457 3,908,746
Note: See notes for Table 2a.
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occurring in one city during a brief time inter-
val); in the empirical analysis here we include
county-level, state-level, and national-level
variables in addition to bank-specific character-
istics. Our sample period for dating bank fail-
ures is from January 1930 to December 1933,
and our fundamentals (on which the predictions
of survival or failure are based) are observed
from January 1930 through March 1933.
Our explanatory variables are expressed as
ratios (rather than log ratios) to avoid omitting
from the sample observations with a value of
zero. In results not reported here, we defined our
regressors as log ratios, and this transformation
did not affect our results much, but did reduce
our sample size. For the high-frequency state-
level and national-level variables we included
only one lagged value of each, based on some
experimentation to find the lag length with the
greatest explanatory power. Below we report
results using lags of five months for state-level
building permits, national-level agricultural
prices, and national-level liabilities of failed
businesses, and three quarters for state-level
liabilities of failed businesses. We also experi-
mented with using moving averages of these
variables. The results described below for the
influence of other variables are robust to varia-
tion in the specific lag structures of the high-
frequency variables. The definitions of the
variables used in the regressions are given in
Table 1 and summary statistics for these vari-
ables are provided in Table 4.
Table 5 (a and b) presents survival duration
TABLE 3a—NUMBER OF FAILED SAMPLE BANKS, SEMIANNUALLY, 1930–1933,
AS PERCENT OF TOTAL NUMBER OF SAMPLE BANKS, 1929
Region 1930-1 1930-2 1931-1 1931-2 1932-1 1932-2 1933-All Total
Central 0.27 0.53 0.81 1.36 1.07 0.45 2.35 6.85
Mid-Atlantic 0.23 0.46 0.92 1.67 1.08 0.52 1.90 6.77
Mountain 1.01 0.88 0.63 2.01 1.13 1.13 2.26 9.05
New England 0.15 0.15 0.59 1.32 0.88 0.00 3.22 6.30
Northwestern 0.40 0.47 0.66 1.07 0.58 0.68 1.80 5.67
Pacific 0.31 0.31 1.02 1.02 2.34 1.43 2.14 8.55
South Atlantic 0.89 0.68 0.89 1.53 0.85 0.38 1.10 6.32
South Central 0.64 0.80 1.12 0.96 0.80 0.73 1.15 6.22
Total 0.45 0.56 0.84 1.27 0.92 0.61 1.82 6.47
Notes: Tables are constructed from 1,716 failed banks in the authors’ total data set of 8,470 Federal Reserve Member Banks.
Deposits are those recorded from the last available call report prior to failure. Regions are defined as follows: New England
contains ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, and CT. Mid-Atlantic contains NY, NJ, and PA. South Atlantic contains MD, DE, DC, VA,
WV, NC, SC, GA, and FL. South Central contains KY, TN, AL, MS, AR, OK, LA, and TX. Central contains OH, IL, IN,
MI, and WI. Northwestern contains MN, IA, MO, ND, SD, NE, and KS. Mountain contains MT, ID, WY, CO, NM, AZ, UT,
and NV. Pacific contains WA, OR, and CA. State-level quarterly versions of these tables are available in Calomiris and
Mason, 2000.
TABLE 3b—DEPOSITS OF FAILED SAMPLE BANKS, SEMIANNUALLY, 1930–1933,
AS PERCENT OF TOTAL DEPOSITS IN SAMPLE BANKS, 1929
Region 1930-1 1930-2 1931-1 1931-2 1932-1 1932-2 1933-All Total
Central 0.30 0.64 0.90 2.94 1.14 2.09 8.67 16.68
Mid-Atlantic 0.28 0.17 0.49 0.71 1.50 0.08 0.65 3.87
Mountain 0.72 0.23 0.22 0.79 0.33 1.54 2.00 5.84
New England 0.03 0.05 0.30 1.52 4.25 0.00 1.74 7.89
Northwestern 0.69 0.51 0.56 0.84 0.78 0.76 2.70 6.83
Pacific 0.02 0.12 0.11 0.19 0.66 0.31 1.58 3.00
South Atlantic 1.49 1.94 0.58 1.37 1.05 0.21 4.51 11.15
South Central 0.69 2.04 1.61 1.05 1.00 1.62 0.75 8.76
Total 0.38 0.52 0.61 1.24 1.37 0.71 2.84 7.67
Note: See notes for Table 3a.
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results for the period January 1930 through
March 1933. Including bank failures in 1933 in
our study posed a problem that required us to
exercise judgment about the “correct” timing of
the failure of banks. Bank holidays were de-
clared at the state and national levels in February
FIGURE 2. AGRICULTURAL PRICE INDEX AND FAILURE PROBABILITY, JANUARY 1930–DECEMBER 1933
FIGURE 1. LIABILITIES OF FAILED BUSINESS AND FAILURE PROBABILITY, JANUARY 1930–DECEMBER 1933
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and March 1933, which entailed the partial sus-
pension of bank operations for periods of time.
Many banks failed during and immediately after
the bank holidays. Some banks that did not
reopen in March 1933 after suspension re-
mained in a state of regulatory limbo for several
months. Many of these banks failed in late 1933
after the regulators and the Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corporation (RFC) decided not to ap-
prove them for membership in the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which
began operation in January 1934. The decision
to permit banks to reopen sometimes followed
approval of assistance from the RFC, and
Mason (2001a) finds empirical evidence that
preferred stock assistance from the RFC (which
began in 1933) did help banks to avoid failure.
Thus the meaning and the timing of bank
failures become less clear after February 1933.
In particular, some banks that officially failed
after March 1933 could be deemed reasonably
to have failed in March, and some banks that
did not fail officially could be deemed to have
failed in March but been rescued by the RFC’s
new preferred stock program. We experimented
with many alternative ways of dealing with the
problem of the bank holidays.
In our survival analysis reported below, we
truncate both the determinants of failure and the
observed failure dates in March 1933. We iden-
tify only those banks that officially failed in
March as March failures. We also tried several
alternative approaches to dealing with the prob-
lem of bank holidays. One alternative approach
would be to assume that the banks that officially
failed between April and December 1933 had
actually failed in March 1933. The results for
that approach are also similar to those reported
below, except that (by construction) there is a
large and significant residual for the month of
March 1933. We chose to report the first version
over this alternative approach because we think
that despite its limitations, the first approach
distinguishes to some extent between banks that
failed in March and those that failed later in
1933, which were arguably stronger. Another
alternative approach is to truncate all observa-
tions of regressors and failures in January 1933.
The coefficients derived for the determinants of
failure using that approach are very similar to
those we report below. The problem with that
third approach is that it does not permit us to
examine whether there are unexplained residual
failures during the alleged panic of early 1933
FIGURE 3. BUILDING PERMITS AND FAILURE PROBABILITY, JANUARY 1930–DECEMBER 1933





Survival Model (Full Sample)
Dependent variable
Log(DAYS UNTIL FAILURE) 269,683 5.913 1.320 0.000 7.078
MONTHLY BANK FAILURE RATE 269,683 0.005 0.068 0.000 1.000
Bank data, December 31, 1929
LTotAss 7,553 13.974 1.265 10.960 21.312
STBANK 7,553 0.112 0.316 0.000 1.000
LNBRANCH 7,553 8.858 1.861 9.210 4.934
MKTPWR 7,553 0.993 0.067 0.038 1.000
NonCash_TotAss 7,553 0.766 0.107 0.064 0.965
Loans_OtherNonCash 7,553 0.744 0.186 0.030 0.997
LIQLOANS 7,553 0.284 0.216 0.000 0.999
Losses_Exp 7,553 0.165 0.145 0.000 0.911
REO_NonCash 7,553 0.013 0.025 0.000 0.340
(BONDYLD)  (SEC) 7,553 0.007 0.004 0.023 0.000
(DD  DTB)_TD 7,553 0.520 0.229 0.000 1.000
DTB_TD 7,553 0.033 0.061 0.000 0.748
DFB_CashAss 7,553 0.281 0.172 0.000 1.000
BPR_TD 7,553 0.028 0.049 0.000 0.504
PrivBPR_BPR 7,553 0.052 0.165 0.000 0.993
NW_TA 7,553 0.149 0.061 0.031 0.601
INTCOST 7,553 0.011 0.010 0.000 0.598
Bank data, December 31, 1931
LTotAss 6,857 13.887 1.325 10.752 21.197
STBANK 6,857 0.126 0.332 0.000 1.000
LNBRANCH 6,857 8.856 1.872 9.210 4.934
MKTPWR 6,857 0.990 0.082 0.026 1.000
NonCash_TotAss 6,857 0.760 0.109 0.130 0.978
Loans_OtherNonCash 6,857 0.701 0.192 0.015 0.997
LIQLOANS 6,857 0.253 0.198 0.000 0.999
Losses_Exp 6,857 0.298 0.203 0.000 0.926
REO_NonCash 6,857 0.014 0.024 0.000 0.385
(BONDYLD)  (SEC) 6,857 0.080 0.043 0.001 0.258
(DD  DTB)_TD 6,857 0.467 0.233 0.000 1.000
DTB_TD 6,857 0.028 0.055 0.000 0.683
DFB_CashAss 6,857 0.244 0.171 0.000 1.000
BPR_TD 6,857 0.048 0.072 0.000 0.588
PrivBPR_BPR 6,857 0.069 0.180 0.000 1.000
NW_TA 6,857 0.166 0.069 0.010 0.635
INTCOST 6,857 0.012 0.019 0.000 0.995
Distress variables
FSPANIC-30 269,683 0.081 0.272 0.000 1.000
FSPANIC-31a 269,683 0.052 0.222 0.000 1.000
FSPANIC-31b 269,683 0.075 0.263 0.000 1.000
DUM_JAN-33 269,683 0.023 0.151 0.000 1.000
DUM_FEB-33 269,683 0.023 0.151 0.000 1.000
DUM_MAR-33 269,683 0.023 0.150 0.000 1.000
(FSPANIC-30)  (DFB_CashAss) 269,683 0.023 0.091 0.000 1.000
(FSPANIC-31a)  (DFB_CashAss) 269,683 0.015 0.074 0.000 1.000
(FSPANIC-31b)  (DFB_CashAss) 269,683 0.021 0.088 0.000 1.000
WICKER-30 269,683 0.003 0.054 0.000 1.000
WICKER-31a 269,683 0.008 0.090 0.000 1.000
WICKER-31b 269,683 0.006 0.079 0.000 1.000
(WICKER-30)  (DFB_CashAss) 269,683 0.001 0.021 0.000 1.000
(WICKER-31a)  (DFB_CashAss) 269,683 0.002 0.025 0.000 1.000
(WICKER-31b)  (DFB_CashAss) 269,683 0.001 0.021 0.000 1.000
Chicago-6-32 269,683 0.000 0.015 0.000 1.000
NEARFAILS 269,683 0.972 15.235 16.118 20.026





Survival Model (215 City Sample)
Log(DAYS UNTIL FAILURE) 53,032 5.922 1.317 0.000 7.078
MONTHLY BANK FAILURE RATE 53,032 0.004 0.065 0.000 1.000
Bank data, December 31, 1929
LTotAss 1,470 15.057 1.506 11.645 20.862
STBANK 1,470 0.196 0.397 0.000 1.000
LNBRANCH 1,470 7.970 3.342 9.210 4.934
MKTPWR 1,470 0.974 0.124 0.044 1.000
NonCash_TotAss 1,470 0.786 0.097 0.245 0.965
Loans_OtherNonCash 1,470 0.727 0.175 0.030 0.996
LIQLOANS 1,470 0.189 0.172 0.000 0.980
Losses_Exp 1,470 0.143 0.123 0.000 0.799
REO_NonCash 1,470 0.007 0.014 0.000 0.121
(BONDYLD)  (SEC) 1,470 0.007 0.004 0.022 0.000
(DD  DTB)_TD 1,470 0.511 0.215 0.000 1.000
DTB_TD 1,470 0.058 0.082 0.000 0.559
DFB_CashAss 1,470 0.256 0.162 0.000 1.000
BPR_TD 1,470 0.029 0.045 0.000 0.294
PrivBPR_BPR 1,470 0.058 0.170 0.000 0.993
NW_TA 1,470 0.148 0.065 0.045 0.601
INTCOST 1,470 0.012 0.006 0.000 0.151
Bank data, December 31, 1931
LTotAss 1,383 15.004 1.570 11.462 20.720
STBANK 1,383 0.205 0.404 0.000 1.000
LNBRANCH 1,383 7.976 3.352 9.210 4.934
MKTPWR 1,383 0.961 0.159 0.037 1.000
NonCash_TotAss 1,383 0.764 0.110 0.237 0.962
Loans_OtherNonCash 1,383 0.678 0.177 0.015 0.993
LIQLOANS 1,383 0.161 0.143 0.000 0.998
Losses_Exp 1,383 0.306 0.200 0.000 0.926
REO_NonCash 1,383 0.010 0.016 0.000 0.144
(BONDYLD)  (SEC) 1,383 0.080 0.042 0.001 0.239
(DD  DTB)_TD 1,383 0.454 0.223 0.000 1.000
DTB_TD 1,383 0.053 0.077 0.000 0.589
DFB_CashAss 1,383 0.219 0.162 0.000 0.877
BPR_TD 1,383 0.044 0.063 0.000 0.376
PrivBPR_BPR 1,383 0.088 0.207 0.000 0.956
NW_TA 1,383 0.159 0.070 0.010 0.635
INTCOST 1,383 0.013 0.035 0.000 0.995
Distress variables
FSPANIC-30 53,032 0.079 0.271 0.000 1.000
FSPANIC-31a 53,032 0.051 0.221 0.000 1.000
FSPANIC-31b 53,032 0.074 0.262 0.000 1.000
DUM_JAN-33 53,032 0.024 0.152 0.000 1.000
DUM_FEB-33 53,032 0.024 0.152 0.000 1.000
DUM_MAR-33 53,032 0.023 0.151 0.000 1.000
(FSPANIC-30)  (DFB_CashAss) 53,032 0.020 0.083 0.000 1.000
(FSPANIC-31a)  (DFB_CashAss) 53,032 0.013 0.067 0.000 1.000
(FSPANIC-31b)  (DFB_CashAss) 53,032 0.019 0.080 0.000 1.000
WICKER-30 53,032 0.001 0.036 0.000 1.000
WICKER-31a 53,032 0.008 0.088 0.000 1.000
WICKER-31b 53,032 0.007 0.081 0.000 1.000
(WICKER-30)  (DFB_CashAss) 53,032 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.649
(WICKER-31a)  (DFB_CashAss) 53,032 0.002 0.027 0.000 1.000
(WICKER-31b)  (DFB_CashAss) 53,032 0.001 0.020 0.000 1.000
Chicago-6-32 53,032 0.001 0.033 0.000 1.000
NEARFAILS 53,032 0.729 15.422 16.118 20.026
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(that is, failures significantly greater than pre-
dicted by a stable model of failure determinants
for the whole period).
Our model of bank survival posits that the
duration of survival (measured in days) depends
on fundamentals, which are measured at up to
monthly frequency. The survival status of banks
after March 1933 is treated as unknown. For
each month from January 1930 until March
1933 the future survival paths of banks are
regressed on fundamentals to compute the pre-
dicted survival hazard function (i.e., the coeffi-
cients for the model).
Table 5a reports results for what we term the
“basic model,” which includes fundamentals
and a time trend. The eight columns in Ta-
ble 5b report coefficient values for eight addi-
tional specifications that include variables
intended to capture the possible presence of
panic, contagion, or illiquidity crises. For the
most part, the coefficients on fundamentals in
Table 5b do not change importantly when the
various panic variables are added to the basic
specification, and to conserve space we do not
report those coefficients. The exceptions are the
coefficients on (BONDYLD)  (SEC) and
NATDAGP_Lag5M, which do vary across
specifications.
We consider four types of variables to cap-
ture illiquidity crises, contagion, or panics.
First, we include national-level indicator vari-
ables for specific panic windows identified by
Friedman and Schwartz (1963). Second, we add
regional panic indicator variables to capture the
regional panics identified by Wicker (1996),
and the Chicago 1932 panic. Calomiris and Ma-
son (1997) show that Chicago did indeed suffer
a panic in June 1932, but that runs on banks
during the panic did not result in the failures of
solvent banks. We include the Chicago panic
variable not to test for contagion-induced fail-
ures there (since our tests are less informative
for answering that question than our earlier pa-
per) but rather to gauge the extent to which
indicator variables may exaggerate the extent to
which panics induced bank failures because of
missing location-specific fundamental indica-
tors, as we discuss further below. Third, we
include a measure of local contagion (NEAR-
FAILS) to capture the effect of the failure of
nearby banks (other banks within the same state
that failed in that same month) for predicting a
bank’s probability of failure.
Fourth, we consider “interaction effects” re-
lated to panics. Specifically, we investigate
whether measures of bank liquidity or linkages
among banks through interbank deposits had
special effects on bank failure hazard during
episodes identified as panics by prior authors.
For example, the ratio of interbank deposits
owed to total bank deposits (DTB_TD) may






PCT_CROPINC30 2,187 0.991 0.059 0.000 1.000
PCT_ACRES_PAST30 2,249 0.386 0.205 0.000 1.000
VALGR_INC_CROP30 2,259 0.416 0.281 0.000 0.982
UNEMP30 2,252 0.044 0.031 0.000 0.271
SMLFM30 2,254 0.534 0.292 0.000 1.000
(DAGLBE)  (PCT_CROPINC30) 2,187 0.223 1.009 1.534 25.805
PCT_STBANK 2,259 0.583 0.251 0.000 1.000
Quarterly State Data
STBUSFAIL 565 7.006 2.551 24.488 3.640
Monthly State Data
STBUILDPERM5 1,693 14.423 1.188 19.290 11.716
STBUILDPERM3 1,693 13.781 1.083 15.056 26.185
Monthly National Data
NATDAGP 39 0.003 0.036 0.070 0.078
NATDBUSFAIL 39 0.003 0.172 0.349 0.432
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Evidence of a significant negative coefficient on
this variable may suggest that liquidity risk was
a significant contributor to failure risk through-
out our period. Our test of interaction effects
examines whether alleged panic episodes were
times of unusual sensitivity to liquidity risk.
The use of panic indicator variables, interac-
tion effects, or nearby failures to test for conta-
gion in producing unwarranted bank failures is
a “one-sided” test, by which we mean that it is
capable of rejecting, but not proving, the pres-
ence of a contagion effect. A statistically sig-
nificant negative coefficient for any of the four
types of panic/contagion indicators implies one
of two possibilities: (1) an increased probability
of failure that is unrelated to long-run funda-
mentals (i.e., an unwarranted failure related to
temporary illiquidity or contagion), or (2) an
incomplete model of fundamentals, where the
elements missing in the model matter more for
the failures of banks in some times and places
than for others. For example, finding a negative
residual in our survival model for a particular
month may mean that a panic in that month
caused failures, or it may mean that our model
lacks a fundamental that was important during
that month. Finding no significant negative re-
sidual or special liquidity interaction effects
TABLE 5a—SURVIVAL REGRESSIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL FED MEMBER BANKS, DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
LOG DAYS UNTIL FAILURE AFTER DECEMBER 31, 1929
FULL SAMPLE OF FED MEMBER BANKS




Constant 6.044 BPR_TD 1.490
(0.283) (0.146)
LTotAss 0.105 PrivBPR_BPR 0.126
(0.011) (0.050)
STBANK 0.136 INTCOST 0.671
(0.031) (0.428)
LNBRANCH 0.012 PCT_INC_CROP30 0.317
(0.006) (0.093)
MKTPWR 0.259 PCT_ACRES_PAST30 0.063
(0.099) (0.063)
NonCash_TotAss 0.845 VALGR_INC_CROP30 0.016
(0.124) (0.058)
Loans_OtherNonCash 0.229 UNEMP30 1.204
(0.058) (0.315)
LIQLOANS 0.115 SMFARM30 0.075
(0.054) (0.052)
Losses_Exp 0.027 (DAGLBE)  (PCT_CROPINC30) 0.139
(0.049) (0.036)
REO_NonCash 3.415 PCT_STBANK 0.288
(0.331) (0.047)
(BONDYLD)  (SEC) 0.247 STBUILDPERM_Lag5M 0.054
(0.239) (0.010)
NW_TA 1.700 STBUSFAIL_Lag3Q 0.005
(0.184) (0.004)
(DD  DTB)_TD 0.164 NATDAGP_Lag5M 0.086
(0.059) (0.264)
DTB_TD 0.478 NATDBUSFAIL_Lag5M 0.057
(0.203) (0.054)
DFB_CashAss 0.059 TIME 0.044
(0.060) (0.001)
Number of observations (bank-months) 269,683
Log-likelihood 11,704
Sources and definitions: Definitions of variables are provided in Table 1 and sources are described in the Data Appendix. Indicator
variables for individual months appear as DUM, followed by the month and year of the indicator variable. Lags are indicated by
appending_Lag, followed by an indication of the lag length (3M three months, 3Q three quarters). Time is a monthly time trend.
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during a Friedman-Schwartz panic window,
however, provides evidence against the view
that contagion or illiquidity produced bank fail-
ures in that month that cannot be explained by
fundamentals.
Similarly, regional indicators and interaction
effects, and the NEARFAILS variable, provide
one-sided tests of local or regional contagion;
the absence of statistically significant negative
coefficients indicates no residual failures asso-
ciated with particular regions, or occurring in
the neighborhood of other failed banks, but the
significance of these effects may simply indi-
cate the absence of regressors that capture im-
portant local or regional fundamentals. The
potential for making false inferences from these
indicators warrants emphasis, especially in light
of the fact that all of these indicators were
TABLE 5b—MODIFIED SURVIVAL REGRESSIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL FED MEMBER BANKS, PANIC VARIABLE RESULTS
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(BONDYLD)  (SEC) 1.334 0.168 1.072 0.720 0.115 0.338 1.220 2.139
(0.280) (0.244) (0.265) (0.202) (0.234) (0.218) (0.290) (0.979)
NATDAGP_Lag5M 0.930 0.181 0.806 0.794 0.058 0.924 0.696 1.005
(0.295) (0.270) (0.282) (0.216) (0.259) (0.234) (0.304) (0.999)
FSPANIC-30 0.073 0.122 0.140 0.101
(0.035) (0.035) (0.047) (0.051)
FSPANIC-31a 0.046 0.050 0.106 0.135
(0.037) (0.036) (0.048) (0.052)
FSPANIC-31b 0.086 0.043 0.066 0.053
(0.029) (0.028) (0.040) (0.043)
DUM_JAN33 0.619 0.570 0.510 0.478 0.568 0.369
(0.063) (0.060) (0.045) (0.049) (0.067) (0.268)
DUM_FEB33 0.452 0.412 0.415 0.401 0.411 0.588
(0.070) (0.066) (0.051) (0.055) (0.074) (0.226)
DUM_MAR33 0.060 0.042 0.173 0.135 0.112 0.511
(0.088) (0.084) (0.064) (0.070) (0.093) (0.497)
(FSPANIC-30)  (DFB_CashAss) 0.028 0.140
(0.151) (0.163)
(FSPANIC-31a)  (DFB_CashAss) 0.049 0.087
(0.140) (0.153)
(FSPANIC-31b)  (DFB_CashAss) 0.277 0.245
(0.113) (0.123)
WICKER-30 0.464 0.439 0.419 0.150 0.327 0.625
(0.085) (0.078) (0.117) (0.121) (0.082) (0.326)
WICKER-31a 0.055 0.047 0.215 0.193
(0.084) (0.074) (0.123) (0.133)
WICKER-31b 0.307 0.190 0.136 0.093 0.230 0.034
(0.073) (0.065) (0.121) (0.132) (0.070) (0.255)
(WICKER-30)  (DFB_CashAss) 0.298 0.429
(0.301) (0.326)
(WICKER-31a)  (DFB_CashAss) 0.677 0.514
(0.451) (0.487)
(WICKER-31b)  (DFB_CashAss) 0.126 0.236
(0.433) (0.474)
Chicago-6-32 1.378 1.078 1.259 0.430
(0.727) (0.504) (0.601) (0.353)
NEARFAILS 0.004 0.006 0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Number of observations (bank-months) 269,683 269,683 269,683 269,683 269,683 269,683 269,683 53,032
Log-likelihood 11,644 11,681 11,628 11,643 11,679 11,569 11,568 2,076
Sources and definitions: All models utilize the control variable specification in Table 5a. The results for the control variables
do not qualitatively differ from those reported in Table 5a in the presence of the panic variables. Definitions of variables are
provided in Table 1 and sources are described in the Data Appendix. Indicator variables for individual months appear as
DUM, followed by the month and year of the indicator variable. Lags are indicated by appending_Lag, followed by an
indication of the lag length (3M  three months, 3Q  three quarters).
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constructed based on ex post observations of
bank failures. If our fundamental model is in-
complete (as it surely is), then indicator vari-
ables and interaction effects for specific dates
constructed from ex post observations of fail-
ures could prove significant even in the absence
of true contagion or illiquidity crises.
It is also important to note that indicator
variables are uninformative about the particular
mechanism through which illiquidity or conta-
gion produces bank failure. Significant unex-
plained residuals for particular times and places
may indicate failures caused by an external
drain (as in a flight from the dollar) that pro-
duces exogenous withdrawal pressure on banks.
Some historians have argued that such a mech-
anism may have been important in the fall of
1931 and in early 1933. Alternatively, unex-
plained residual effects may indicate “panic” in
reaction to a “contagion of fear” about bank
solvency (that is, a massive loss of confidence
in the domestic banking system). While we will
sometimes refer to the indicator variables as
“panic” or “contagion” indicators, for conve-
nience, it is important to bear in mind that—
particularly in the case of the nationwide
indicator variables for the fall of 1931 and early
1933—our measures of possible panic/conta-
gion/illiquidity do not distinguish possible ef-
fects of a loss of confidence in domestic banks
from a crisis produced by a run on the currency.
A. Indicators of Bank Failure Risk
Before reviewing the results in Table 5, we
first explain the logic underlying the fundamen-
tal predictors of survival (see also Calomiris and
Mason, 1997). According to basic finance the-
ory, the probability of insolvency should be an
increasing function of two basic bank charac-
teristics: asset risk and leverage. Liquidity of
assets relative to liabilities may be an additional
factor influencing the risk of failure.
Our measures of fundamental bank attributes
capture variation in bank asset risk, leverage,
and liquidity. Banks that are larger (higher
LTotAss) are better able to diversify their loan
portfolios, reducing their asset risk. Thus, ce-
teris paribus, large banks should have lower
failure risk (higher survival hazard). Banks that
achieve their size through a branching network
(LNBRANCH) should also be more diversified,
ceteris paribus. There is substantial evidence for
the stabilizing effects of branching in U.S.
banking history (Calomiris, 2000). Neverthe-
less, as contemporaries during the Depression
and Calomiris and David C. Wheelock (1995)
note, some of the largest branching networks in
the United States collapsed during the 1930’s,
indicating that the 1930’s may have been some-
thing of an exception from the standpoint of
the stability of branching banks. Many large
branching banks were active acquirers during
the 1920’s, taking advantage of windows of
opportunity provided by the distress of unit
banks. Many of those acquirers, therefore, were
in a vulnerable position (i.e., they had just ac-
quired a relatively weak portfolio of assets) at
the beginning of the 1930’s. Furthermore, Mark
Carlson (2001) argues that branching made
banks more vulnerable to the aggregate shocks
of the Great Depression. Branching provides
diversification of sectoral risks, and thus per-
mits branching banks to take on more loan risk.
But branching does not offer as much protection
during an economywide Depression (like that of
the 1930’s) that affects all sectors. Because
branching banks believed that they were more
protected against loan loss than other banks,
they took on more loan risk and were subject to
a greater shock when Depression-era loan losses
occurred.
State-chartered banks operate under different
regulations, and in general were given greater
latitude in lending. Thus, it may be that national
banks were constrained to have lower asset risk
than state banks.
Measures of the proportions of different cat-
egories of assets (NonCash_TotAss, Loans_
OtherNonCash, LIQLOANS, and DFB_CashAss)
capture the degree of ex ante asset risk, and the
liquidity of assets. Loan losses (Losses_Exp)
and real estate owned (REO_NonCashAss) are
ex post measures of asset quality.
Bank net worth relative to assets (NW_TA)
measures the extent of leverage using book val-
ues. Book values are imperfect measures of net
worth, but market values are not available for
most of the banks in our sample. The structure
of bank liabilities (captured here by various
ratios of components of deposits relative to total
deposits) also provides information about bank
failure. Calomiris and Mason (1997), among
others, have found that weak banks were forced
to expand their reliance on high-cost categories
of debt (that is, debt held by relatively informed
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parties), and that the ratio of bills payable to
total deposits (BPR_TD) is a useful indicator of
fundamental weakness. It may also be that a
reliance on demandable debt (DD  DTB) in-
creased bank liquidity risk, and thereby contrib-
uted to failure. The average interest rate paid on
deposits (INTCOST) is a direct measure of bank
default risk, but a lagging measure (dependent
on the frequency of deposit rollover).
The bank market power variable is included
to capture the potential role of “rents” related to
a bank’s market power for boosting the market
value of bank net worth, and therefore, reducing
the effective leverage ratio of the bank. Carlos
D. Ramirez (2000) found this variable was use-
ful in predicting failures of banks in Virginia
and West Virginia in the late 1920’s.
We also include a measure of the exposure of
the bank’s securities portfolio to changes in
bond yields (BONDYLD  SEC), to capture
what we call the “Temin effect.” Temin (1976,
p. 84) writes that: “The principal reason usually
given for [post-1930] bank failures is the de-
cline in the capital value of bank portfolios
coming from the decline in the market value of
securities.” Wicker (1996, p. 100) disputes that
view, and argues instead that bank loan quality
was the dominant source of fundamental shock
that led to bank failures. Our model includes
measures of loan quantity and quality, but we
also include BONDYLD  SEC to capture
bank vulnerability to changes in bond yields.
Some county-level characteristics take ac-
count of the shares of various elements of the
agricultural sector in the county economy, and
the extent to which agricultural investment
grew during the 1920’s. That emphasis reflects
the view of White (1984), Wicker (1996), and
others that much of the distress suffered by
banks during the 1930’s was a continuation of
the distress suffered in agricultural areas during
the 1920’s. Other county-level, state-level, and
national-level variables (including unemploy-
ment, building permits, business failures, and
agricultural prices) capture general economic
conditions in the county, state, and country.4
B. Regression Results for the Bank Survival
Model
The results for the basic model in Table
5a show that many fundamentals have explan-
atory power for bank survival (failure). Gener-
ally, coefficients are of the predicted sign and
highly significant. Bank size (LTotAss) is pos-
itively associated with survival. Higher net
worth is also associated with longer survival. A
reliance on demandable debt rather than time
deposits, where the demandable debt ratio is the
sum of demand deposits held by the public and
interbank deposits relative to total deposits
[(DD  DTB)_TD], lowers survival probabil-
ity. But interbank deposits have a much larger
effect than demand deposits of the public. The
interbank deposits effect is given by the sum of
the coefficients on (DD  DTB)_TD and on
DTB_TD (that is, the sum of 0.164 and
0.478). The effect of interbank deposits may
reflect either liquidity risk or the fact that weak
banks were forced to rely more on interbank
credit, and our results are not able to distinguish
between these two interpretations. Consistent
with the latter interpretation, nondemandable
debt from informed creditors (bills payable or
rediscounts), however, has the largest effect on
survival probability of any debt category. Bills
payable or rediscounts from official sources en-
ters with a coefficient of 1.490, while such
debt from private sources has a somewhat larger
effect (the sum of the two coefficients, 1.490
and 0.126).
State-chartered banks (STBANK) were less
likely to fail, ceteris paribus, than national
banks. This is a somewhat surprising result for
which we lack a clear interpretation. Neverthe-
less, we are able to say that constraints on the
lending of national banks likely were not very
important for limiting their relative risk. Our
interpretation of the state-chartered indicator
4 One potential concern is reverse causation—that is, the
possibility that business failures or building permits are
endogenous to shocks originating in the banking sector. For
example, it is possible that panics produce declines in build-
ing and increases in business failures, which in turn predict
future bank distress (either because of serial correlation in
bank distress, or because of fundamental links from eco-
nomic activity to banking distress). That problem is miti-
gated, but not eliminated, by our use of lagged values of
high-frequency fundamentals. Calomiris and Mason (2003a,
2003b) address the question of the dynamic relationship
among bank failures, business failures, and building permits
at the state level. We find little effect of autonomous shocks
to bank failures on other variables, and little serial correla-
tion in the bank failure process. Thus, those results support
the assumed exogeneity of fundamental determinants of
bank failure.
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variable is not complicated by possible selec-
tivity bias related to a bank’s choice of location
(i.e., that state banks were more present in cer-
tain counties) because we include a separate
variable (PCT_STBANK) to capture the pro-
pensity of banks in a given county to be state-
chartered, and therefore, we control for
location-specific selectivity bias. That control
variable has a negative sign, indicating that
counties with a greater proportion of state-
chartered banks suffered higher bank failure
rates, ceteris paribus.
Branching (LNBRANCH) is negatively re-
lated to survival duration, after controlling for
other effects (including size). This result may
reflect the unusual vulnerability of branching
banks in the early 1930’s. In future work, we
plan to investigate the extent to which prior
acquisitions of distressed banks by branching
banks may explain this result.
Consistent with Ramirez’s (2000) findings
for Virginia and West Virginia in the late
1920’s, greater market power (MKTPWR) low-
ers failure risk.
Consistent with Wicker’s (1996) emphasis on
loan quality as a source of fundamental prob-
lems, more lending and lower bank asset quality
(measured either ex ante by NonCash_TotAss,
Loans_OtherNonCash, and LIQLOANS or ex
post by REO_NonCashAss) is associated with
lower survival. We found no differences in fail-
ure risk associated with the composition of cash
assets (which we define as the sum of cash,
reserves at the Fed, government securities, and
deposits due from banks). We report the results
for the ratio of due from banks relative to total
cash assets (DFB_CashAss), where the coeffi-
cient measures the effect of increasing the rel-
ative share of due from banks in total cash
assets. It has an insignificant positive effect on
survival duration.
Higher debt interest cost is associated with
lower survival rates, but this is not a significant
or robust result. The insignificance of higher
debt interest cost reflects the correlation be-
tween interest cost and other regressors that
capture asset risk, leverage, and debt composi-
tion. In the absence of those other variables, it is
a significant predictor of failure risk.
Banks with relatively high securities portfo-
lios suffered greater risk of failure when bond
yields rose, as predicted by Temin (1976), but
the effect is not significant in the basic model.
Note, however, that the size of the coefficient on
(BONDYLD)  (SEC) is larger and often sig-
nificant in other regressions in Table 5, specif-
ically in regressions that include indicator
variables for the first three months of 1933 [that
is, regressions other than (1), (3), and (6)]. This
result has an intuitive interpretation; when one
controls for the most important episode of na-
tionwide panic or illiquidity crisis (during
which a flight to quality would have raised the
price of government securities, but not other
securities held by banks), the Temin effect on
the average securities portfolio should be
stronger.
Thus our results on the effects of bank port-
folio composition on failure risk indicate that, in
a sense, both Temin and Wicker were correct:
banks with more lending, and riskier lending,
were more vulnerable than other banks, ceteris
paribus, but to the extent banks had securities
portfolios, rising bond yields increased their
failure risk.
Some county characteristics are highly sig-
nificant. Higher unemployment (UNEMP30)
lowered bank survival rates. More agriculture,
per se, does not appear to have been a problem.
In fact, a reliance on agriculture as a source of
income was associated with increased survival
rates. But the relative health of the agricultural
sector made a difference for bank survival. In
counties where agriculture was an important
and healthy sector, as indicated by the inter-
action of the percent of income earned from
crops and the investment in agricultural capital
during the 1920’s [(DAGLBE)  (PCT_
CROPINC30)], bank survival rates were higher.
The extent that a county’s agricultural income
was based in grains (VALGR_INC_CROP30),
as opposed to pasture (PCT_ACRES_PAST30),
did not enter significantly. A greater presence of
small farms in a county (SMFARM30) had a
negative, but not a highly significant or robust,
effect on bank survival.
At the state level, the effect of lagged
monthly building permits (STBUILDPERM_
lag5) on bank survival proves positive and
highly significant, while lagged quarterly liabil-
ities of business failures does not prove signif-
icant. At the national level, monthly liabilities
of business failures has a negative sign but is
not highly significant. Monthly agricultural
price change is insignificant in the basic model,
but becomes significant when panic indicator
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variables are added [in regressions (2), (4), (5),
(7), and (8)].
Regression (2) in Table 5b shows the result of
including indicator variables for Friedman-
Schwartz national banking crises alongside our
other variables. Owing to the complexity of the
suspension and failure process in early 1933,
the 1933 crisis indicators are divided into three
separate monthly indicator variables for Janu-
ary, February, and March. Regression (3) of
Table 5b includes indicator variables for the
three regional panics identified by Wicker. Re-
gression (4) of Table 5b includes both the
Friedman-Schwartz and the Wicker crisis indi-
cator variables. Regression (5) adds interactive
effects related to due from banks to the speci-
fication of regression (4). Regression (6) adds
the June 1932 Chicago panic indicator alone to
our basic model. Regression (7) adds the
Chicago panic indicator and the NEARFAILS
variable to the regression (5) specification. Re-
gression (8) drops many of the insignificant
regressors from regression (7). Regression (9) is
the same as regression (8), but includes only
banks in the principal 215 cities in the United
States, which permits a comparison of the de-
terminants of failure in rural and urban areas.
In regression (2), and in all other specifica-
tions, we find that the indicator variables for
two of the four Friedman-Schwartz panics
(those of late 1930 and mid-1931) are positive
and, in one case, significant. That is, contrary to
Friedman and Schwartz, those episodes were
times of unusually high bank survival, after
controlling for fundamentals, not episodes of
inexplicably high bank failure. We do not view
this result as indicative of “irrational exhuber-
ance” on the part of depositors during those
episodes, but rather of an incomplete model of
fundamentals. The indicator variable for the
September–November 1931 period is signifi-
cant and negative in regression (2), as are the
indicator variables for January and February
1933. The indicator for March 1933 is insignif-
icant. If we had assigned all bank failures for
April–December 1933 to March 1933 (which
we argue, on balance, against doing above) the
only qualitative difference in our results is the
indicator variable for March 1933, which be-
comes much larger in absolute value and sig-
nificant. Thus, unsurprisingly, one cannot reject
the possibility that March bank failures resulted
from contagion if one includes many banks that
failed after March in the definition of March
failures.
The results in regressions (3) and (4) support
(but do not prove) Wicker’s view that sudden
waves of bank failure unrelated to observable
fundamentals (prior to 1933) were largely re-
gional affairs. Two of Wicker’s regional indi-
cators prove negative and significant (for late
1930 and for September–October 1931). An
indicator for the third regional panic identified
by Wicker (that is, mid-1931) enters with the
wrong sign and is not significant. In regression
(4), in the presence of the Wicker regional in-
dicator for the fall of 1931, the Friedman and
Schwartz national indicator for that episode de-
clines in magnitude and becomes statistically
insignificant.
Conclusions based on the magnitude and sig-
nificance of indicator variables for panics could
conceivably provide a misleading picture of the
effects of panic episodes on the bank failure
process. For example, even if panics are epi-
sodes in which liquidity matters a great deal for
the incidence of bank failure, and in which
indicators of fundamental solvency do not mat-
ter as much as during nonpanic episodes, panic
indicator variables might not prove negative
and significant in a regression that assumes re-
gression coefficients are constant.
Thus, it is conceivable that our conclusions
about the first three Friedman-Schwartz epi-
sodes could change if we took account of
changes in regression coefficients during those
episodes. To investigate that possibility, we re-
laxed the assumption that the coefficients on our
fundamentals were constant, and allowed them
to vary over time. Specifically, we allowed co-
efficients to change during the first three epi-
sodes identified by Friedman and Schwartz as
panics. Our results did not support the view that
indicators of liquidity mattered more during
panics, or that indicators of fundamental insol-
vency mattered less during panics. Indeed, our
failure risk model was remarkably stable. In the
first Friedman-Schwartz episode (late 1930),
three variables out of 28 showed somewhat
significant changes in coefficients during the
episode: the state bank indicator (a 0.0159 sig-
nificance level), the ratio of private bills payable
and rediscounts to total bills payable and redis-
counts (a 0.0479 significance level), and interest
cost (a 0.0263 significance level). In the second
Friedman-Schwartz episode, no coefficient
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changes were significant. In the third episode,
due from banks as a fraction of cash assets was
significant (at the 0.0033 significance level).
Three facts are salient. First, randomly one
should expect that three out of 84 regressors
would be significant at the 0.0357 level (that is,
1/28), and we found that only three variables
were significant at that level. Second, different
interaction variables were significant across ep-
isodes. Third, only one of the coefficients is
possibly interpretable as a special panic liquid-
ity effect—the negative effect for the interaction
of the third episode with the due from banks
variable, (FSPANIC-31b)  (DFB_CashAss).
In other words, in the fall of 1931, banks that
relied on deposits in other banks as a source of
cash assets found that those assets were not
perfect substitutes for other cash assets (cash,
reserves at the Fed, and government securities).
To further investigate the role of the due from
banks variable during alleged panics, in regres-
sions (5) and (7) of Table 5b we include inter-
action effects that allow the coefficient on
DFB_CashAss to vary during all the episodes
identified by Friedman and Schwartz or by
Wicker as panics. As Table 5b shows, this effect
is only significant for (FSPANIC-31b) (DFB_
CashAss). Including that variable, however,
changes the sign of the FSPANIC-31b indicator
variable to positive, and reduces the overall
combined effect of the two variables (when
evaluated at the mean of DFB_CashAss). Over-
all, we concluded that our survival model is
quite stable over time and that there is little
gained from allowing coefficients to change
during episodes of alleged panic.5
In results not reported here, we also experi-
mented with disaggregation of the DFB_
CashAss variable (which our data allow us to
divide among accounts held in Chicago, New
York, or other cities). We found that accounts
held in Chicago entered negatively relative to
those of other cities, but this result disappears in
the presence of the indicator variable for the
June 1932 Chicago banking panic. In other
words, the illiquidity of money held in Chicago
banks was mainly relevant only for the failure
risk of Chicago banks, and only in one month of
the sample.
With respect to local contagion, the NEAR-
FAILS variable is significant in all survival
regressions that include it, even when the
Friedman-Schwartz and Wicker indicator vari-
ables are also included. The June 1932 indicator
for Chicago is significant even when we include
the NEARFAILS variable in the regression.
Since Calomiris and Mason (1997) provide ev-
idence against viewing bank failures in Chicago
in June 1932 as the result of contagion, we view
that finding as illustrative of the danger of in-
terpreting indicator variables as proof of con-
tagion (rather than as evidence of missing
fundamentals).
In regression (9), we investigate differences
between city banks and rural banks. All vari-
ables are defined similarly to those of the pre-
vious regressions with one exception; building
permits are defined at the level of the city in
which the bank is located, rather than aggre-
gated to the state level. Results are similar to
those of regression (8), apart from differences in
significance that may be attributable to the rel-
atively small sample size of city banks (which
comprise roughly one-fifth of our nationwide
sample). The main differences between regres-
sions (8) and (9) are as follows. Deposits held
by banks (DTB_TD) has a smaller and insignif-
icant sign in the city bank failure regression.
This result suggests that deposits held by rural
banks in city banks were not a source of special
illiquidity risk during the Great Depression.
Other differences include the insignificance of
county unemployment for city banks, the
smaller and less significant coefficients for the
Wicker-31b indicator and the indicator for the
Chicago panic of June 1932. Perhaps not sur-
prisingly, the latter effect indicates that in com-
parison to other cities, and using a model
derived solely from the experience of city
banks, there is less of an unexplained residual
for Chicago bank failures in June 1932.
In summary, our results provide evidence
against the Friedman-Schwartz view that the
bank failures of late 1930 and 1931 were au-
tonomous shocks produced by nationwide con-
tagion or panic. Our results are consistent with
(but do not prove) Wicker’s (1996) view that
regional rather than national contagion charac-
terized the crises of late 1930 and late 1931, and
they are consistent with (but do not prove)
5 We also experimented with varying regression coeffi-
cients during January and February 1933. One of 28 regres-
sors—total bills payable and rediscounts (BPR_TD)—was
somewhat significant (with a 0.051 significance level).
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Friedman and Schwartz’s and Wicker’s view
that bank failures in January–February 1933
resulted in part from nationwide panic. Our
finding that local bank failures raise the proba-
bility that another local bank will fail is also
consistent either with omitted local fundamen-
tals or local bank contagion.
C. Placing an Upper Bound on the
Importance of “Panic” Effects
Are the effects of panics (national, regional,
or local) potentially large economically as well
as significant statistically for the United States
as a whole? Thus far, we have argued that some
indicators of local, regional, or national panic
cannot be rejected. That is, some bank failures
are not fully explained by a stable model of the
bank failure process for the period 1930–1933.
Late 1930 and late 1931 may have been epi-
sodes of regional panic. January and February
1933 may have been a time of nationwide panic.
Local contagion effects may have been present
throughout the sample period. As we have re-
peatedly noted, all of our tests of panic or con-
tagion effects are “one-sided” and likely
overestimate the true incidence of panic, since
relevant fundamentals are likely omitted from
our model.
Nevertheless, our estimates of local, regional,
and national panic effects can be used to place
an upper bound on the importance of estimated
panic effects for the United States as a whole.
Figures 4–7 plot the mean estimated survival
duration (in days) for banks in our sample over
time, using different estimation equations, with
and without taking account of panic indicator
variables. All the figures display a rising trend,
which reflects the rising average conditional
survival probability of banks over our time
period.
Figure 4 corresponds to regression (2) of
Table 5b, in which only the basic model cum
Friedman-Schwartz indicator variables is used
for the estimation. The dashed line in Figure 4 is
the mean survival estimate using all the basic
regression coefficients, and the Friedman-
Schwartz indicators for the late-1931 period and
the early-1933 period (the indicators for late
1930 and mid-1931 are set at zero). The solid
line in Figure 4 shows the average estimated
survival duration if all the Friedman-Schwartz
indicator variables are set at zero. Figure
4 shows that even if one wanted to argue that
FIGURE 4. PREDICTED SURVIVAL DURING FRIEDMAN AND SCHWARTZ “PANIC” EPISODES
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the late-1931 episode was a nationwide panic
(contrary to the evidence presented above), it is
still not an important episode of unexplained
bank failure. In contrast, including indicators
for January and February 1933 substantially
reduces the predicted average survival duration
in those months. We conclude that our upper
bound estimate of the effects of national panic
indicate potentially important effects from pan-
ics only in early 1933.
Figure 5 corresponds to regression (3) of
Table 5b. As in Figure 4, the dashed line is the
prediction of the basic model plus the first and
third Wicker indicator variables (as before, the
indicator variable with the “wrong sign” is set at
zero). The solid line shows the effect of omit-
ting the Wicker indicators for the two episodes.
Note that these effects, while substantial for the
banks in the affected regions, are confined to
those regions, and thus are not large for the
nation as a whole. In the case of the 1930
regional episode, only 394 banks are in the
regions affected by the indicator variable; in the
case of the late 1930 regional episode, 1,714
banks are in affected regions.
Figure 6 corresponds to regression (6) of
Table 5b. The dashed line of the figure includes
the effects of all coefficients, while the solid
line excludes the June 1932 Chicago indicator
variable. The estimated effect on survival dura-
tion, while large for affected banks, is trivial for
the country as a whole because only 29 Chicago
banks are affected.
The NEARFAILS variable can be used to put
an upper bound on the potential importance of
location-specific contagion effects. In a survival
regression that includes the basic model and
NEARFAILS, the omission of NEARFAILS
from the estimation of survival duration raises
the average estimated survival duration of
banks for each month in our sample period by
an average of 0.2 percent. Figure 7 shows the
effect of omitting this effect from the survival
model.
We conclude that prior to January 1933, the
effects of panics—whether national, regional,
FIGURE 5. PREDICTED SURVIVAL DURING WICKER “PANIC” EPISODES
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or local—contributed little to the failure risk of
Fed member banks in the nation as a whole. A
stable model of bank fundamentals can account
for the bulk of regional and temporal variation
in bank failure risk during the period 1930–
1933.
Our conclusion that panic effects were not
potentially important until January 1933 has
three important implications for the literature on
bank failures during the Great Depression. First,
it implies a limited role for nonfundamental
causes of bank failures during the Depression.
January 1933 was quite late in the history of the
Depression (which reached its trough in March
1933). Second, it implies that bank failures dur-
ing the crucial period of 1930–1932, which saw
substantial declines in bank assets and deposits,
were not an autonomous shock, but rather an
endogenous reflection of bank condition and
economic circumstances. Third, the special cir-
cumstances of early 1933—the origins of which
Wigmore (1987) traces to a run on the dollar
rather than a loss of confidence in the solvency
of the banking system—suggest that the only
nationwide episode that saw the sudden burst in
bank failures unrelated to measures of funda-
mentals may have had little to do initially with
a “contagion of fear” about banks and more to
do with expectations of Roosevelt’s departure
from gold, which in the event, were accurate. In
other words, one could argue that the missing
“fundamental” in the failure risk model was the
probability of the government’s departure from
gold. That interpretation of the events of 1933
would suggest even less room for “contagions
of fear” about bank condition as a contributing
influence to bank failure during the Depression.
III. Conclusion
We are able to identify close links between
fundamentals and the likelihood of individual
bank failure from 1930 through 1933. Funda-
mentals include both the attributes of individual
banks, and the exogenous local, regional, and
national economic shocks that affected their
health. We also develop a set of tests for the
presence of liquidity crises or contagion. In
addition to regressors that capture fundamental
determinants of bank distress, we include
FIGURE 6. PREDICTED SURVIVAL DURING CHICAGO “PANIC” EPISODE
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indicator variables to capture residual effects of
alleged national and regional panic episodes
identified by Friedman and Schwartz (1963)
and Wicker (1996). This approach is capable of
rejecting, but not convincingly confirming, the
incidence of panics. We find no evidence that
bank failures were induced by a national bank-
ing panic in the first three episodes Friedman
and Schwartz identify as panics (late 1930, mid-
1931, and late 1931). We do find, however, that
in January and February 1933 there is a signif-
icant increase in bank failure hazard that is not
explained by our model of fundamentals.
Indicator variables for the states and periods
identified by Wicker as suffering regional crises
in 1930 and 1931 indicate significant region-
specific increases in the probability of bank
failure that are not explained by our model of
fundamentals in two of the three cases identified
by Wicker (late 1930 and late 1931). At the
local level, we find that the failure of nearby
banks (NEARFAILS) is associated with an in-
crease in the probability of bank failure.
When we find evidence consistent with the
presence of panics our results have two possible
interpretations: either that illiquidity crises oc-
curred and resulted in some unwarranted bank
failures (as Friedman and Schwartz and Wicker
have argued) or that our model of the funda-
mental causes of bank failures is incomplete.
The results of our earlier study of the Chicago
banking panic of June 1932 (Calomiris and Ma-
son, 1997) indicated that banks in Chicago in
June 1932 did not fail due to an illiquidity crisis
or panic, but rather as the result of fundamental
shocks that were local and sudden. That exam-
ple leads us to believe that it is quite possible
that the significance of the January–February
1933 panic indicators, the NEARFAILS vari-
able, and two of the Wicker panic indicators
result at least in part from a failure to fully
model changes in relevant economic conditions.
In future work, we intend to take a closer look
at bank failures during the regional crises of
1930 and 1931, and at the January–February
1933 nationwide experience, to investigate that
possibility.
Our results indicate a much smaller role for
FIGURE 7. PREDICTED SURVIVAL WITH OTHER DEPOSITS IN FAILED BANKS IN THE COUNTY
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contagion and liquidity crises in explaining the
bank failures of 1930–1932 (and the contrac-
tion of the money stock that accompanied them)
than that envisioned by Friedman and Schwartz
(1963). The regional panics identified by
Wicker may have been important local or re-
gional events, but they had small and temporary
effects on average bank failure hazard in the
aggregate. And the effect of location-specific
contagion seems to have been similarly small in
its importance. To the extent that nationwide
panic may explain bank failures, its role is rel-
atively late in the sequence of events of the
Depression and brief (lasting a matter of weeks
in early 1933), and involved a small proportion
of the bank failures during the period 1930–
1933. Our findings suggest that disaggregated
analysis of bank failures and deposit shrinkage
leads to a much smaller role for contagion in
understanding bank distress during the Great
Depression.
Nevertheless, three caveats warrant mention.
First, our sample consists of Fed member banks.
It may be that nonmember banks had a different
susceptibility to panics. Second, we use failure
rather than suspension as our measure of bank
distress. We are unaware of any records of
individual bank suspension dates, and also con-
sider failure a more meaningful indicator of
distress (following the reasoning of Ali Anari et
al., 2002), but we recognize that suspensions
that did not result in failure may also have been
disruptive, and that we are not able to capture
those effects in our analysis. Third, there are
other potential mechanisms for the transmission
of contagion that we have not been able to
investigate. For example, ownership linkages
among chain banks may have been important in
promoting runs on the solvent affiliates of failed
banks. It remains to be seen how ownership
linkages, or perhaps correspondent linkages,
may have mattered for the transmission of fail-
ure among banks during the Depression.
With respect to the policy implications of our
findings, it is important to distinguish macro-
economic and microeconomic policies. There
can be little doubt that expansionary open mar-
ket operations in 1930 and 1931 (or departure
from the gold standard in 1931, when many
other countries did so) could have avoided mac-
roeconomic collapse in 1931–1933, and there-
fore, would have substantially mitigated bank
distress. Without a different macroeconomic
policy, given the importance of fundamental
sources of bank failure, it is doubtful whether
the Federal Reserve System, state governments,
or the national government could have done
much in the way of traditional microeconomic
liquidity assistance (either through collateral-
ized lending or temporary suspension of
convertibility) to rescue failing banks during
1930–1932. Only a combination of expansion-
ary monetary policy and bank bailouts (e.g., in
the form of subsidized bank recapitalization, as
was effected by the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation after the banking crisis of 1933)
could have prevented banks from failing in
1930–1932 (see Mason, 2001a).
Policy options in 1933 are more ambiguous.
The fact that the only nationwide episode during
which panic indicators are significant (early
1933) coincided with substantial external drain
(the alleged run on the dollar in early 1933)
suggests that liquidity assistance targeted to in-
dividual banks might have been helpful in Jan-
uary 1933, particularly if it had been combined
with expansionary monetary policy and an im-
mediate departure from the gold standard.6
DATA APPENDIX
Our data set contains a wide variety of vari-
ables that differ by frequency, geographic
scope, and level of disaggregation. In this Ap-
pendix we describe briefly the definitions and
sources for our data, and explain the limits of
our sample.
The data used in our analysis can be broken
down into six major types: individual bank
characteristic data; county-level bank character-
istic data; county economic data; state eco-
nomic data; national economic data; and other
data constructed to measure systemic bank dis-
tress. Following are the sources and details un-
derlying each type of data.
I. Individual Bank Characteristics
With the help and support of the St. Louis Fed
and the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign,
6 If Wigmore is right about the run on the dollar in early
1933, one could argue that lender of last resort assistance
and expansionary monetary policy in early 1933 would have
been ineffectual in stemming the outflow from the banks
without an immediate departure from gold.
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and subsequently, with funding from the Na-
tional Science Foundation, we assembled bank-
level balance sheet and income statement data
from microfilm records of “call reports” of Fed-
eral Reserve member banks (see Mason, 1998,
for an overview of the call report data we col-
lected). Individual bank data come from origi-
nal manuscript Reports of Condition (forms
Federal Reserve 105 and Treasury 2129) and
Reports of Earnings and Dividends (forms Fed-
eral Reserve 107 and Treasury 2130) filed by
Federal Reserve member banks. In 1946, the
Federal Reserve Board began microfilming
original manuscript call reports for selected
dates back to 1914. The Board authorized the
destruction of extant manuscript Reports of
Condition and Reports of Earnings and Divi-
dends after microfilming. Though summary
individual bank balance sheet data were some-
times published in annual reports of the Federal
and state bank supervisory authorities, the mi-
crofilm record available at the Board is the only
known record of original manuscript Reports of
Condition that remain from the early twentieth
century, and this record contains far more detail
than any published source. Furthermore, the
microfilm record is the only source of individual
bank data from the Reports of Earnings and
Dividends.
Data in the microfilm collection are not avail-
able equally for both State Member and Na-
tional Banks. For State Member Banks, June
and December Reports of Condition were mi-
crofilmed for each year during the Great De-
pression. For National Banks, however, only
selected dates were microfilmed. Those dates
are December 1929, 1931, 1933, and annually
thereafter.
Over an eight-year period we hand-entered
and checked data for all available banks in this
collection between the years 1929 and 1935.
We used existing National Bank charter num-
bers and constructed State Bank charter num-
bers to link each set of individual bank records
across time. The final data set includes 66,316
bank records from 10,092 banks. Since the
present paper is only concerned with events
prior to the Bank Holiday of March 1933, we
restrict ourselves to bank data reported on De-
cember 31, 1929 and December 31, 1931.
Therefore the present analysis incorporates
14,410 bank records from 7,931 banks.
Each bank record contains roughly 100 data
fields. These fields include not only typical con-
solidated balance sheet items, but also earnings
and expense information from bank income
statements. Additionally, we gathered informa-
tion from detailed schedules of asset, liability,
earnings, and expense compositions of each
bank. Call reports also contain information on
the number of branches operated by each bank.
Table A1 lists the fields we entered.
We also gathered bank structure data (that is,
data on individual bank failures, mergers, ac-
quisitions, name changes, etc ...) linking banks
to exit events including record dates of failures.
The structure data for National Banks was hand-
entered from the unpublished Comptroller of
the Currency structure records located in that
agency’s archives. Structure data for State
Member banks was hand-entered from Rand
McNally’s Banker’s Directory. Our structure
data contain almost 70 different ways a bank
can exit the data set, ranging from all imag-
inable types of mergers and acquisitions to
relatively simple voluntary liquidations and re-
ceiverships (which, together, we term failures).
For our present work we only utilize data on
voluntary liquidations and receiverships.
Our data on failures for Fed member banks
identify the date at which banks were placed
into receivership or were closed by voluntary
liquidation. All results reported below combine
receivership and voluntary liquidation into a
single measure of bank failure. Results not re-
ported here show slight differences in results for
the two categories taken separately, and thus
little advantage to analyzing them separately.
Many banking studies have had to rely on
bank suspension rather than liquidation as their
measure of bank failure. Suspensions are typi-
cally employed because data on bank failures,
both for numbers and deposits of failed banks,
are not readily available at the regional or na-
tional level, especially for observations at
greater than annual frequency. Data on suspen-
sions can provide a misleading picture of bank
failure. In some cases, suspensions were tem-
porary and suspended banks quickly reopened
(Calomiris, 1992). Furthermore, suspension is
not consistently defined in the literature. The
Federal Reserve series on bank “suspensions,”
published in Banking and Monetary Statistics
(1976), mixes suspensions (of state-chartered
banks) and liquidations (of national banks).
The distinction between suspension and fail-
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ure is particularly important during early
1933—a time when virtually all banks “sus-
pended” operations during state and national
bank holidays, but during which only some of
those banks failed. Developing a database on
bank failures makes it possible to investigate the
role of contagion in bank failures during early
1933, which is not possible using suspension
data. Understanding the determinants of the
large number of bank failures in early 1933 is a
crucial and omitted part of the history of bank
distress during the Depression.
The main obstacle to collecting comprehen-
sive bank failure data at high frequency is the
absence of readily available information for
non-Fed member banks (hereinafter referred to
as nonmember banks). Given that our data on
balance sheets and income statements only in-
clude member banks, this limitation was not a
problem from the standpoint of analyzing the
failure experiences of banks in our sample.
Even though our sample includes nearly all
Fed member banks, one can question whether
that sample of banks is representative, given the
large number of excluded nonmember banks. It
is worth noting that nonmember banks were
much smaller on average than member banks,
so their number exaggerates their importance.
As of June 30, 1929, nonmember banks com-
prised 15,797 of the 24,504 banks in existence
(of which 7,530 were national banks and 1,177
were state-chartered member banks). But non-
member banks only accounted for 27 percent of
banking system deposits ($13.2 billion of the
total $49.0 billion).7 The broad patterns of
growth of member and nonmember banks are
similar in loans and deposits, although non-
member banks grew more slowly in the period
1921–1929 (loans grew by an average of 27
percent for nonmember banks, as opposed to 42
percent for member banks) and shrank more
quickly from 1929 to 1932 (nonmember banks’
loans declined by an average of 48 percent,
compared to a 35 percent decline for member
banks). These patterns reflect in large part the
consolidation wave produced by agricultural
distress in the 1920’s (which was reflected in
the greater growth of member banks) and the
greater continuing vulnerability of small, non-
member banks in the 1930’s. Exit rates were
higher for nonmember banks than for member
banks during the Depression; nonmember banks
fell as a proportion of total banks from 63
percent of the number of banks in June 1929 to
57 percent by June 1933.8 Nevertheless, our
sample of member banks includes a large num-
ber of failed institutions. There were 7,498 Fed
member banks in our sample as of the end of
December 1929. 1,528 banks in our sample
(including banks that entered after December
1929) had failed by the end of 1933 (that is,
were placed into receivership or were voluntar-
ily liquidated).
Thus our sample of member banks comprises
a large segment of the banking sector, but the
exclusion of nonmember banks reduces the
bank failure rate. From an aggregate standpoint,
the variation over time in bank failures apparent
in Figure 1 of our paper using our definition (the
hazard rate of survival for member banks) is
quite similar to the pattern when one defines the
failure process using the deposits of all sus-
pended commercial banks). In particular, our
measured raw hazard rate of failure increases
markedly during the episodes of banking crisis
identified by Friedman and Schwartz (1963).
Our analysis of bank failure risk for individ-
ual banks is for 1930–1933. The beginning of
this period is dictated by the starting date for our
balance sheet data (i.e., December 1929). The
end of this period is dictated by the events of
early 1933, which saw the suspension of bank
operations through bank holidays, first at the
state level via a series of actions by the various
state authorities in February and March 1933,
and finally at the federal level in March 1933.
March 1933 was the end of the last wave of
sudden bank failure during the Depression, the
time when the United States departed from the
gold standard, and marked the beginning of the
recovery of 1933–1937.
The number of banks that failed in the legal
sense (i.e., that were placed into receivership or
voluntarily liquidated) in March 1933 under-
states the true number of failures at that time.
Many banks that had suspended in early 1933
remained in limbo until the regulatory authori-
ties and the RFC determined whether to assist
7 Data are from Federal Reserve Board (1976, pp. 22–
23).
8 Data are from Wicker (1996, pp. 15), derived from
Federal Reserve Board (1976, pp. 22–23, 72, 74).
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them and whether to permit them to become
members of the FDIC. The large number of
bank failures in late 1933 and early 1934, there-
fore, might be best viewed as delayed reactions
to the shocks of early 1933. We discuss this
problem in more detail in our empirical analysis
of bank failures.9
II. County-Level Bank Characteristics
Our county-level bank data come from the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
Data on Banks in the United States, 1920–1936
[Intra-university Consortium for Political and
Social Research (ICPSR) study number 00007].
This source provides, for state and national
banks, jointly and individually, bank deposits
and the number of banks in each county an-
nually. The data set also reports the number of
banks and deposits in banks that suspended
each year, also at the county level. For some
reason, counties in Wyoming are not included
in this data set, and so any empirical work
that relies on this source excludes Wyoming
counties.
The FDIC data allow us to check our distress
specification more accurately against previous
work by using suspension rates at the county
level as a dependent variable in addition to
failures (at the bank level). Furthermore, the
FDIC data allow us to model deposit flows at
the county level for a more robust interpreta-
tion of bank distress. The FDIC data yield a
measure of the size of the banking sector at
the county level that captures all banks, not
only Federal Reserve member banks. We use
county-level measures of deposits and sus-
pensions in our county-level regression anal-
ysis of bank distress. In those regressions,
explanatory variables aggregate individual
bank characteristics to the county level by
simple averaging (rather than weighting by
size). We use simple averaging at the county
level to correct for the undersampling of
small banks that results from our reliance on
Fed member banks.
III. Other County-Level Characteristics
County-level characteristic data come from
Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social
Data: The United States, 1790–1970 [(ICPSR)
study number 00003]. This source yields county
data on, among other items, unemployment
rates, acres of land devoted to agricultural pro-
duction, the value of agricultural production,
land devoted to and value derived from different
agricultural product types, the number of farms
in different size categories, and the value of
agricultural investment. These data help control
for different asset classes, relative values of
bank portfolios, and other exogenous factors
that may affect bank distress.
The county characteristic data from the
ICPSR are coded from decadal U.S. census
data. We drew upon ICPSR data from 1920,
1930, and 1940 so we could test various spec-
ifications including mixtures of levels and
growth rates.
IV. State-Level Economic Data
State characteristic data are included to in-
corporate higher-frequency time-series data into
our analysis of the causes and effects of bank
distress. However, higher frequency sometimes
comes at the expense of more geographical
aggregation.
We felt it was important to include available
measures of local distress that control for het-
erogeneity in economic conditions across the
United States at different times during the Great
Depression. Bradstreet’s Weekly published a
monthly summary of building activity in 215
major U.S. cities during the period of the Great
Depression, broken down by new construction
and alterations. We include the total series as a
monthly indicator of economic conditions in the
local community. When our survival model is
restricted to banks located in the 215 major
cities, this variable includes building permits at
the city level. When the survival model includes
all Fed member banks, building permits are
aggregated to the state level.
An important indicator of local economic
conditions is liabilities of failed businesses at
the local level. However, there is no single
series of liabilities of failed businesses for the
entire period comprising the Great Depression.
We therefore collected a state-level monthly
9 Over the course of 1933, banks would be examined and
either permitted to survive or forced to close. For discus-
sions of bank resolution policy during 1933, see Cyril B.
Upham and Edwin Lamke (1934), Susan E. Kennedy
(1973), Wicker (1996), and Mason (2001b).
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series of the number and liabilities of failed
businesses from Bradstreet’s Weekly December
1928 through June 1931 and a regional quar-
terly series from Dun’s Review first quarter
1931 through fourth quarter 1932.
To construct quarterly state-level measures
of these variables at the state level for the
second two quarters of 1931, and for 1932, we
combined annual state-level figures from
Dun’s Review with the quarterly region-level
figures. Specifically, for the last two quarters
of 1931, we allocated the total liabilities of
failed firms to each of the two quarters by
assuming that the relative proportion of fail-
ures in each quarter was the same within any
region. We used the same method to allocate
each state’s 1932 failures into the four quar-
ters of that year. We use the overlapping
period during the first two quarters of 1931 to
calibrate the estimation.
We also experimented with annual state in-
come measures from John A. Slaughter (1937),
but these did not prove significant or robust.
V. National Economic Data
Although we were able to obtain state-level
data on business failures at quarterly fre-
quency, and state-level data on building per-
mits at monthly frequency, we felt it was
desirable to include additional monthly eco-
nomic data in the specification to capture
high-frequency fundamental changes. Addi-
tional monthly data are only available at the
national level.
We include three national economic variables
in our specifications. The first of these is an
index of agricultural prices published in The
Farm Real Estate Situation (U.S. Department of
Agriculture, various issues). We initially gath-
ered seven price series on individual commod-
ity groups including: grains; fruits and
vegetables; meat animals; dairy products; poul-
try products; cotton and cotton seed; and all
groups (30 items). We tested these both indi-
vidually and interacted with our county agricul-
ture characteristic data. Only the national
overall index proved significant and robust in
our specifications, and is included in our final
results.
The second national economic variable in-
cluded in our specification is liabilities of failed
businesses (outside the banking sector). The
source of this series is Dun’s Review, which
published a continuous national series through-
out our period.
Third, we include Treasury bond yields that
control for market conditions affecting bank
investments, particularly relating to the value of
U.S. government securities in bank portfolios.
Our treasury yields come from Banking and
Monetary Statistics, and reflect yields on
“... non-callable bonds or callable bonds selling
below call price, in other words, bonds which
are free to reflect changes in interest rates” (p.
428). We also experimented with corporate
bonds and the Baa spread over Treasuries,
though these were neither significant nor
robust and are excluded from our present
specification.
VI. Other Data for Measuring Distress
We include variables in our specifications
that control for several widely held sources of
bank distress. These include indicators of al-
leged national panic episodes as reported by
Friedman and Schwartz (1963), indicators of
alleged regional panics reported by Wicker
(1980; 1996), an indicator for the Chicago
bank panic discussed at length by James
(1938) and Calomiris and Mason (1997), and
a constructed measure of nearby bank
failures.
Friedman and Schwartz national panics are
captured by indicator variables that take the
value of 1 for all banks during panic months and
0 otherwise. The panic periods we adopt from
Friedman and Schwartz and their associated
dates are: November 1930–January 1931, May–
June 1931, September–November 1931, and
separate indicators for January, February, and
March 1933. Robustness checks confirmed that
extending or contracting the panic windows for
the 1930 or 1931 episodes reduced the magni-
tude and significance of the indicator variables
in our specifications.
Wicker regional panics are captured by indi-
cator variables that take the value of 1 for banks
in affected regions during panic periods and 0
otherwise. The panic periods we adopt from
Wicker and their associated states and dates in
our specification are: November 1930–January
1931 for banks in Tennessee, Kentucky, Ar-
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kansas, North Carolina, and Mississippi,
April–July 1931 for banks in Illinois and
Ohio, and September–October 1931 for banks
in West Virginia, Ohio, Missouri, Illinois, and
Pennsylvania.
The Chicago bank panic is captured by an
indicator variable taking the value of 1 for
banks in the city of Chicago during June 1932
and 0 otherwise.
Nearby bank failures are characterized by
using our member bank data (described in detail
above) to aggregate deposits in failed banks at
the state level for each monthly period. We
experimented with various failure windows and
lag specifications on deposits in nearby bank
failures. Contemporaneous monthly data (ex-
cluding each failed bank’s own deposits where
applicable) yielded the most significant and ro-
bust results.
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